In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, agents participate in multiple single-item second-price auctions at once. As some items might be substitutes, agents need to strategize in order to maximize their utilities. A number of results indicate that high welfare can be achieved this way, giving bounds on the welfare at equilibrium. Recently, however, criticism has been raised that equilibria are hard to compute and therefore unlikely to be attained.
Introduction
In a combinatorial auction, n players compete for the assignment of m items. The players have private preferences over bundles of items as expressed by a valuation function v i : 2
[m] → R ≥0 . Our goal in this work is to find a partition of the items into sets S 1 , . . . , S n that maximizes social welfare i v i (S i ), based on reported valuations (bids) b i : 2
[m] → R ≥0
with the freedom to impose payments p 1 , . . . , p n on the players. Even if valuations are known, finding an allocation that maximizes social welfare is typically NP-hard. Furthermore, since valuations are assumed to be private information, some mechanics are needed to extract this information. The traditional approach is to incentivize players to bid truthfully. Insisting on truthfulness has the advantage that for the individual players it is easy to participate as it is not necessary to act strategically. However, truthfulness requires central coordination of the entire allocation and payments.
An alternative approach to this problem that is arguably seen more often in practice is to let players participate in a simpler, non-truthful mechanism and to accept strategic behavior. To derive theoretical performance guarantees, one then seeks to prove bounds on the so-called Price of Anarchy, the worst-case ratio between the optimal social welfare and the welfare at equilibrium. The most prominent example in the context of combinatorial auctions is item bidding, where the items are sold through separate single-item auctions.
One can show that for pretty general classes of valuations, such as submodular or the even more general classes fractionally subadditive and subadditive, all equilibria from a broad range of equilibrium concepts obtain a decent fraction of the optimal social welfare. More recently, however, these results have been criticized for ignoring the computational complexity of finding an equilibrium. In fact, by now, there is quite a selection of impossibility results showing that finding exact equilibria is often computationally intractable.
Our approach in this paper is different. We consider simple, best-response dynamics, in which players are activated in a round-robin fashion and players when activated buy their favorite set of items at the current prices, in a myopic way. Christodoulou et al. [7] showed that one instance of such dynamics converges if players' valuation functions are fractionally subadditive. However, they also showed that it takes exponential time. For subadditive valuations, even convergence cannot be guaranteed because any fixed point would be a pure Nash equilibrium, and pure Nash equilibria may not exist (see Appendix A). We show that despite possibly long convergence time or no convergence at all, the social welfare reaches a good level very fast.
The Setting
We study combinatorial auctions with n bidders N and m items M . Each bidder i ∈ N has a valuation function v i : 2 M → R ≥0 . Our objective is to find a feasible allocation, i.e., a partition of the items, S 1 , . . . , S n , that maximizes social welfare i∈N v i (S i ). We assume that an allocation of items to bidders is found by distributed strategic behavior of the bidders using item bidding. That is, each bidder i ∈ N places a bid b i,j on each item j ∈ M . Each item j ∈ M is assigned to the bidder i ∈ N with the highest bid b i,j at a price of p j = max i =i b i ,j . Ties are broken in an arbitrary, but fixed manner.
We assume that bidders choose their bids strategically so as to maximize their quasi-linear utilities. Bidder i's utility u i as a function of the bids
where S is the set of items won by bidder i.
We say that a bid b i is a best response to the bids
Note that any best response must give bidder i a set of items S that maximizes u i (b) = v i (S) − j∈S p j . We call these sets of items demand sets. A (pure) Nash equilibrium in this setting is a profile of bids b = (b i ) i ∈N such that for each bidder i ∈ N his bid b i is a best response against bids b −i .
We study simple game-playing dynamics in which bidders get activated in turn and myopically choose to play a best response. More formally, starting from an initial bid vector b 0 , in each time step t ≥ 1, some bidder i ∈ N is activated and updates his bid b t−1 i from the previous round to a best response to the other players' bids b
−i which do not change from the previous to the current round. The fixed points of such bestresponse dynamics are Nash equilibria. However, Nash equilibria do not necessarily exist and even if they do best-response dynamics may not converge.
We will evaluate best-response dynamics by the social welfare that they achieve. For bid profile b and corresponding allocation S 1 , . . . , S n we write SW (b) = i v i (S i ) for the social welfare at bid profile b. We seek to compare this to the optimal social welfare OP T (v).
Variants of Best-Response Dynamics
Since payments in combinatorial auctions with item bidding are second price, there are typically many ways to choose a best response. Clearly, not all best responses will ensure that good states (in terms of social welfare) will be reached quickly. Suppose we start at b = (0, . . . , 0) and the item assigned to bidder 1. A possible best response sequence has bidders update their bids in round-robin fashion, each time increasing the winning bid by . Example 1.2. (Gross Overbidding) Consider the same setting as in the previous example. If in the first round of updates the last bidder bids C + this will terminate the dynamics.
Note that in both these examples the social welfare after each round of best responses (and on average) is 1, which can be arbitrarily smaller than the optimal social welfare C.
The issue in each of these examples is as follows. Through the bids b i,j , the bidders effectively declare additive valuations. The allocation maximizes the declared welfare DW (b) = i j∈Si b i,j , which usually differs from the actual welfare SW (b). In both examples, there exist update steps in which the declared utility of the bidder, i.e., u
, is very different from his actual utility. We will prove bounds on the welfare achieved by best-response dynamics that are quantified by the extent to which declared utilities can differ from the actual utilities as captured by the following definitions.
for all players i and reachable bid profiles b.
We will usually apply Definition 1.1 when b i is a best response to b −i . However, it also leaves the freedom to consider approximate best responses. We will see that one way to achieve Definition 1.2 is to require strong no overbidding, but we will also see an example of safe dynamics that allow overbidding. Note that in both cases players will have non-negative actual utilities at all times because
for every bidder i and time step t.
Our Results
Our first main result is that roundrobin best-response dynamics are capable of reaching states with near-optimal social welfare strikingly fast, despite the fact that convergence to equilibrium may take exponentially long or they may not converge at all.
In fact, our result applies to any round-robin bidding dynamics, provided that players choose bids that are aggressive enough but not too aggressive. This, in particular, includes dynamics in which players choose to play only approximate best responses. Also, their way of making choices does not need to be consistent in any way.
Main Result 1.1. In a β-safe round-robin bidding dynamic with α-aggressive bid updates the social welfare at any time step t ≥ n satisfies
In other words, once every player had the chance to update his bid, the social welfare, at any time step after that, will be within α/(1 + α + β)β of optimal.
For fractionally subadditive valuations and subadditive valuations there exist round-robin best-response dynamics with (α, β) = (1, 1) and (α, β) = (1/ ln m, 1). The result for XOS requires access to demand and XOS oracles [11] , the result for subadditive valuations requires access to demand oracles and that the greedy algorithm for set cover problems can be executed [16, 2] .
Our guarantee on the social welfare achieved by best-response dynamics shows that these dynamics provide a 1/3 (resp. Ω(1/ log m)) approximation to the optimal social welfare that applies after a single round of bid updates, and at any time step after that.
We also prove a bound on the average social welfare of 1/2(2 + α)β, which improves upon the above bound for large β. In particular, for subadditive valuations it is also possible to achieve (α, β) = (1, ln m). While the point-wise guarantee of this dynamics is only Ω(1/ log 2 m), its average social welfare is within Ω(1/ log m) of optimal.
We show that the point-wise welfare guarantee of 1/3 for fractionally subadditive valuations is tight for the respective mechanism. Our second main result is that the Ω(1/ log m) bounds are almost best possible in a more general sense.
Main Result 1.2. For subadditive valuations no bestresponse dynamics in which players do not overbid on the grand bundle can guarantee a better than o(log log m/ log m) fraction of the optimal social welfare at any time step.
For round-robin bidding dynamics, this point-wise impossibility result extends to an impossibility for the average social welfare that can be achieved.
The assumption that players do not overbid on the grand bundle is quite natural, and is satisfied by all dynamics that have been proposed in the literature. It obviously applies to strong no-overbidding dynamics, but it also applies to dynamics in which players use weak no-overbidding strategies on the items that they win and bid zero on all other items.
Our proof of the lower bound is based on a nontrivial construction exploiting the algebraic properties of linearly independent vector spaces. It presents an interesting separation from the Price of Anarchy literature, where no such lower bound can be proved.
Finally, we explore to which extent our positive results depend on round-robin activation. We show that our positive results extend to the case where at each step a player is chosen uniformly at random, while the social welfare can be as low as O(1/n) of optimal when the order of activation is chosen adversarially.
Related Work
Best-response dynamics are a central topic in Algorithmic Game Theory. Probably, the best-studied application are congestion games, where best-response dynamics always converge but, except in special cases, take worst-case exponential time before they do so [23, 21, 1] . On the other hand, a number of results show that certain types of bestresponse dynamics reach states of low social cost quickly [19, 6, 3, 15, 25] . Some of these results extend to weighted congestion games, where equilibria may not exist and best-response sequences may not converge for this reason.
The study of the Price of Anarchy in combinatorial auctions with item bidding was initiated by Christodoulou et al. [7] , and subsequently refined and improved upon in [2, 20, 26, 14, 18] . Some of these bounds are based on mechanism smoothness, others are not. They provide welfare guarantees for a broad range of equilibrium concepts ranging from pure Nash equilibria, over (coarse) correlated equilibria, to Bayes-Nash equilibria. For fractionally subadditive valuations there is a smoothness-based proof that shows that the Price of Anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria is at most 2 [7, 26] . For subadditive valuations the Price of Anarchy with respect to pure Nash equilibria is also at most 2 [2] , but the best smoothness-based proof gives a bound of O(log m) [2, 26] . In fact, as shown by Roughgarden [24] , combinatorial auctions with item bidding achieve (near-)optimal Price of Anarchy among a broad class of "simple" mechanisms.
Also relevant to our analysis in this context is that Christodoulou et al. [7] gave a simple, best-response dynamics for fractionally subadditive valuations, that they called Potential Procedure. They showed that this procedure always converges to a pure Nash equilibrium, but also that it may take exponentially many steps before it converges.
Lately, attempts at proving Price of Anarchy bounds for combinatorial auctions with item bidding have been criticized for not being constructive, in the sense that the computational complexity of finding an equilibrium remained open. Dobzinski et al. [13] , for example, showed that for subadditive valuations computing a pure Nash equilibrium requires exponential communication. Regarding fractionally subadditive valuations they concluded that "if there exists an efficient algorithm that finds an equilibrium, it must use techniques that are very different from our current ones." Further negative findings were reported by Cai and Papadimitriou [5] , who showed that computing a BayesNash equilibrium is PP-hard.
Most recently, Daskalakis and Syrgkanis [8] considered coarse correlated equilibria. They showed that even for unit-demand players (a strict subclass of submodular) there are no polynomial-time no-regret learning algorithms for finding such equilibria, unless RP ⊇ NP, closing the last gap in the equilibrium landscape. However, they also proposed a novel solution concept to escape the hardness trap, no-envy learning, and gave a polynomial-time no-envy learning algorithm for XOS valuations and complemented this with a proof showing that for this class of valuations every no-envy outcome recovers at least 1/2 of the optimal social welfare.
Further relevant work comes from Devanur et al. [9] , who proposed an alternative to simultaneous secondprice auctions, the so-called single-bid auction. This mechanism also admits a polynomial-time no-regret learning algorithm and by a result of [4] achieves optimal Price of Anarchy bounds within a broader class of mechanisms.
A final point of reference are truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. While no mechanism can achieve a better than 1/m 1/2− approximation for submodular valuations with valuation queries alone [12] , Dobzinski [10] recently managed to improve a longstanding approximation guarantee of Ω(1/ log m) for submodular valuations to Ω(1/ √ log m) for fractionally subadditive valuations, requiring access to both value and demand oracles.
Achieving Aggressive and Safe Bids
As already discussed, best responses are generally not unique in our settings. Our positive results require that updates are aggressive and safe. In this section we briefly describe how to guarantee these properties for fractionally subadditive (a.k.a. XOS) valuations and subadditive valuations. The missing proofs are provided in Appendix B.
A valuation function is fractionally subadditive, or
The dynamics that we consider approach players in round-robin fashion. When player i is activated he picks a demand set D at the current prices and updates his bid as described below. Note that here we assume eager updating. This assumption leads to cleaner proofs, but is not necessary. See the full version for details.
Bid Updates for XOS Valuations
For XOS valuations we can update bids as described by [7] . If D is the demand set chosen by player i, let (v i,j ) j∈M be the supporting valuation on this demand set for which j∈D v i,j = v i (D), and set b t i,j = v i,j for j ∈ D and b t i,j = 0 otherwise. Note that these update steps can be performed in polynomial time using demand and XOS oracles.
Proposition 2.1. Starting from an initial bid vector b 0 satisfying strong no-overbidding, the bid updates described above lead to a sequence of bids
. . that is 1-safe and in which each update is a 1-aggressive best response.
Bid Updates for Subadditive Valuations
For subadditive functions, it is generally not possible to guarantee α = 1 and β = 1 at the same time. We describe two different, reasonable ways of bid updates.
No-Overbidding Updates Given a bid vector
is the utility bidder i can derive from buying the set S. Observe thatũ is subadditive. Let D be an inclusion-wise minimal demand set of bidder i given b −i . We can show thatũ i (S, b
for j ∈ D and b t i,j = 0 otherwise. These update steps can be performed in polynomial time with a demand oracle if it is possible to compute the additive approximation, which corresponds to executing the greedy set-cover algorithm oñ Aggressive Updates The basic construction is the same as above except that instead of considering a i we considerã i such thatã i,j = γ · a i,j for all items j ∈ D, where 0 < γ ≤ ln m is such that 0 that satisfies strong no-overbidding, the bid updates described above lead to a sequence of bids that is ln msafe and in which each update is a 1-aggressive best response.
Welfare Guarantees
In this section we prove our first main result (Theorem 3.1). The theorem provides a point-wise social welfare guarantee, parametrized in α and β, for round-robin bidding dynamics. It shows that the social welfare is high already after a single round of updates, and remains high at every single step after that.
Theorem 3.1. In a β-safe round-robin bidding dynamic with α-aggressive bid updates the social welfare at any time step t ≥ n satisfies
As we have argued in Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2 there exist round-robin best-response dynamics with (α, β) = (1, 1) for fractionally subadditive valuations and (α, β) = (1/ ln m, 1) for subadditive valuations. So two corollaries of our theorem are point-wise welfare guarantees of 1/3 and Ω(1/ log m) for the respective mechanisms.
We also show a welfare guarantee for the average social welfare, Theorem 3.2 below, that improves upon the pointwise guarantee for large β. Note that the term (1 − n T ) is 1 − o(1) for T ∈ ω(n) and at least 1/2 for T ≥ 2n. Theorem 3.2. In a β-safe round-robin bidding dynamic with α-aggressive bid updates the average social welfare in the first T steps satisfies
This theorem shows that the best-response dynamics described in Proposition 2.3 with (α, β) = (1, ln m), whose point-wise welfare guarantee is only Ω(1/ log 2 m) by Theorem 3.1, guarantees an average social welfare of Ω(1/ log m).
In Appendix C we show that the point-wise welfare guarantee of 1/3 for fractionally subadditive valuations is tight for the respective mechanism. In Section 4 we show that the Ω(1/ log m) bounds are essentially best possible in a more general sense.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
The core of our proof of the pointwise welfare guarantee are two lemmata. The first (Lemma 3.2) shows that the declared social welfare after a single round of updates is high when the initial declared welfare is low and the second (Lemma 3.3) shows that the declared welfare after a single round of updates is high when the initial declared welfare is high. To prove these lemmata we need the following auxiliary lemma. 
Proof
is the maximum bid on item j that is placed by one of the bidders 1, . . . , i, z
) . The reason is as follows. For j ∈ S , we have z 
which proves the claim.
With the help of this lemma we can now prove our key lemmata. We thus have
Summing this inequality over all bidders i ∈ N yields
We can upper bound the first sum by DW (b n ) using Lemma 3.1. The double sum adds up every j ∈ M exactly once and we have j∈M p n j = DW (b n ) and 
and,
Using that for all k = i and all j we have b
we obtain that the difference in declared welfare over all bidders between steps i − 1 and i is equal to the difference in bidder i's declared utility at these time steps. Formally,
We now extend this identity to a lower bound on
. Since the bidding sequence is β-safe, u
Summing this inequality over all bidders i ∈ N and using the telescoping sum i∈N (DW (
Since α ≤ 1 and β ≥ 1 the factor (β/α − 1) ≥ 0. We can therefore use Lemma 3.1 to conclude that
This implies the claim.
We will use our key lemmata to show a lower bound on the declared welfare. To relate the declared welfare to the social welfare we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. In a β-safe sequence of bid profiles
Rearranging this and using that β ≥ 1 we obtain
and the claim follows.
We are now ready to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. To prove the guarantee for time step t ≥ n consider the bid sequence of length n + 1 from b t−n to b t . At time steps t − n + 1 to t each bidder updates his bid exactly once. By the virtue of being a subsequence of a β-safe bidding sequence the sequence b t−n , . . . , b t is β-safe. Moreover each bid update is α-aggressive.
Applying first Lemma 3.3 and then Lemma 3.2 with b t taking the role of b n , b t−n taking the role of b 0 , and setting S * 1 , . . . , S * n to the allocation that maximizes welfare we obtain
. Combining this with the previous inequality yields
as claimed.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
With the proof of the pointwise welfare guarantee at hand we have already done the bulk of the work for proving our guarantee regarding the average welfare. The basic idea is to sum the lower bound on the declared welfare at any given time step as provided by Lemma 3.2 over all time steps to obtain a lower bound on the average declare welfare, and to turn this into a lower bound on the actual social welfare using Lemma 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.
We first use Lemma 3.2 to relate the declared welfare at time steps t and t − n to the optimal social welfare. Namely, for all t ≥ n,
Next we take the sum over all time steps t and use that DW (b t ) ≥ 0 to obtain the following lower bound on the average declared welfare
Solving this inequality for
Lower Bound for Subadditive CAs
Next we show our second main result (Theorem 4.1), which shows that no best-response dynamics in which bidders do not overbid on the grand bundle can achieve a point-wise welfare guarantee that is significantly better than 1/ log m. The assumption that bidders do not overbid on the grand bundle seems quite natural, and does allow overbidding on subsets of items. It is satisfied by all dynamics that we have described in Section 2 and more generally by all dynamics that have been proposed in the literature. 
To prove this theorem we show that whenever the second player has updated is bid social welfare will be low. This does not imply that the average welfare will be low as well. However, if we restrict attention to roundrobin dynamics, then we can extend the construction by adding additional players after the second player that play a low-stakes game on separate items forcing the average welfare to be low as well.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1 Our proof of the lower bound is built around the following family of hard instances, with n = 2 players and m = 2 k −1 items. The valuations of the first player are based on an example that demonstrates the worst-case integrality gap for set cover linear programs (see, e.g, [27, Example 13.4]), which has been used in the context of CAs with item bidding before [2] . The crux of our construction is in the design of the second player's valuation function, and its interplay with the valuation function of the first player. 
Note that, in the instances just described, the first player has a valuation of v 1 (M ) ≥ k = log 2 (m + 1) for the grand bundle, while the second player has a maximum valuation of max
for any set of items. To prove the theorem we first use linear algebra to derive a symmetry property of D, which together with weak no-overbidding of the first player on the grand bundle implies the existence of a subset of items D ∈ D with low prices (Lemma 4.1). Intuitively, this is because the sets of items that the second player is interested in are rather small (of size about m/ log m), and there are sufficiently many of these sets. We then show that every demand set of the second player under these prices includes some set of items D ∈ D (Lemma 4.2). In the final step (Lemma 4.3) we show that if the second player buys any such set D , then the first player's valuation for the remaining items M \ D and hence the overall social welfare is at most O(log log m). , where · · q refers to the q-binomial coefficient (see, e.g., [22] ). So, in particular, this number is independent of x. Therefore, instead of taking the average over all items M , we can take the average over all sets D ∈ D and take the average within such a set, i.e., Proof. By our assumption on the sum of the prices of the items in 
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Any best-response dynamics has to ask every bidder infinitely often. We claim that the social welfare is O(log log m) right after each update of the second player. Since the optimal social welfare is Ω(log m) this shows the claim.
Let b t be a bid vector after the second player has made a move. Using Lemma 4.1, we know that there is a set D ∈ D with j∈D b
. By Lemma 4.2, the second player then buys a superset of some D ∈ D. Therefore, right after the second player has updated his bid the first player is allocated a subset of the items M \ D . Lemma 4.3 implies that the social welfare for this allocation is no higher than k − d + ρ2 d = O(log log m).
Beyond Round-Robin Activation
Our positive results make use of the fact that bidders are activated to update their bid in round-robin fashion. That is, between two activations of a bidder, each other bidder is activated exactly once. In this section, we investigate alternative activation protocols. Our first theorem shows that our positive results extend to the case where at each step a random player gets to update his bid.
Theorem 5.1. Consider a β-safe sequence of bids that is generated by choosing at each time step a player uniformly at random and letting this player update his bid to an α-aggressive bid. Then for any time step
Our second theorem shows that if an adversary chooses the order in which the players get to update their bids, then it may take exponentially long before states of high welfare are reached.
Theorem 5.2. For all n and k, there is an instance of n agents and (n − 1) · (k + 1) items and an activation sequence, such that until each agent has been activated Ω(2 k ) times the welfare has never exceeded a 1 n−1 fraction of the optimum.
We defer the proofs of both these results to the full version, where we also present some additional results on adversarial activation.
Concluding Remarks and Outlook
In our analysis we focused on fractionally subadditive and subadditive valuations, which do not exhibit complements. A natural question is whether similar results can be obtained for classes of valuations that exhibit complements. In the full version, we discuss an example with MPH-k valuations that highlights the difficulties that arise. Another interesting follow-up question is whether there is a general result that translates a Price of Anarchy guarantee for a given mechanism that is provable via smoothness into a result that shows that best-response sequences reach states of good social welfare quickly. The example with MPH-k valuations already limits the potential scope of such a result. It would still be interesting to identify natural sufficient conditions. One such condition could be that the mechanism admits some kind of potential function (as the procedure for XOS valuations), but our results already show that this condition is certainly not necessary.
Consequently, we have
By the same argument as in Lemma 4.1, each item j ∈ M is included in the same number of sets D ∈ D. Therefore,
This implies that there is a set D ∈ D such that
Since k ≥ 8 by assumption, m > 2k + 8, and therefore
By Lemma 4.2 and because the second player plays a best response, we have W ⊇ D for some D ∈ D.
In the remainder, we will show that this implies that the first player has a beneficial weakly no-overbidding deviation b 1 .
Let 
where the first inequality uses that b is weakly nooverbidding, the second inequality exploits the definition of v 2 , the third inequality holds by Lemma 4.3, and the final inequality holds because we have assumed k ≥ 8.
The deviation by the first player is beneficial because 0 is strongly no overbidding and at each time step t ≥ 1 some bidder i gets to update his bid to a best response, which is strongly no overbidding, then the resulting best-response dynamic is 1-safe.
Proof. Since the initial bid vector and each update satisfy strong no-overbidding we have j∈S b
C Tightness of Point-wise Guarantee for XOS Valuations
The following proposition shows that the point-wise welfare guarantee of 1/3 for the round-robin best-response dynamics for fractionally subadditive valuations described in Section 2 is tight, even if the valuations are unit demand.
Proposition C.1. Consider the dynamics described in Section 2.1 There is an input with n = 3 players, m = 3 items, and unit-demand valuations and an initial bid vector such that when started from this bid vector the social welfare obtained by the dynamics after a single round of bid updates is 1/3 · OP T (v).
Proof. The valuations of all three bidders are unit demand, i.e., for all players i and sets of items S, v i (S) = max j∈S v i,j . The item valuations v i,j for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 3 are given by the following Suppose that the XOS representation of these valuations is that each player has an additive valuation a i,0 that is all zero and then one for each item j, a i,j , such that a i,j (k) = v i,j for k = j and a i,j (k) = 0 otherwise. Let b 0 be the bid profile in which Player 2 bids 1 + on item 1, all other bids are 0. That is, b 0 = (a 1,0 , a 2,1 , a 3,0 ). Suppose that the order of updates is first player 1 gets to update his bid, then player 2, and then player 3.
Player 1 is already playing a best response to b 0 −1 , so b 1 = b 0 . Now, to get b 2 , player 2 updates his bids to a best-response to b 1 −2 , which is a 2,3 . That is, he bids zero on the first two items and 1 + 3 on the third. So b 2 = (a 1,0 , a 2,3 , a 3,0 ). With these bids, however, bidding 0 on all items is a best-response of player 3, therefore b 3 = b 2 . Observe that SW (b 3 ) = DW (b 3 ) = 1 + 3 , whereas the optimal social welfare is 3 + 2 . The claim follows by letting tend to zero.
